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Impact of MGNREGA on Rural Wages in India: Findings from the Rural Price Collection 
(RPC) surveys (2001-2011) 
 
—Divya Pandey 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Governments in developing countries have experimented with a variety of poverty alleviation 
programs over the last few decades, including conditional and unconditional cash transfer 
programs, microcredit, and employment guarantee schemes, among others. The most successful 
and perhaps the most extensively studied poverty alleviation program has been Mexico’s 
PROGRESA, which adopted a human-capital investment approach towards lowering poverty 
rates. Another increasingly studied poverty alleviation program has been India’s Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) of 2005.1 Unlike 
PROGRESA, however, MGNREGA seeks to alleviate rural poverty by providing guaranteed 
employment to beneficiaries in public works. This paper assesses the impact of MGNREGA on 
rural wages in India, using the National Sample Survey Office’s (NSSO) Rural Price Collection 
(RPC) surveys from 2001-11. Additionally, I look at the gendered impacts of the program to 
specifically assess whether MGNREGA has led to reduction in wage inequality by gender in 
rural India.  
MGNREGA offers 100 days of guaranteed employment in a financial year (1stApril-31st March) 
to rural households whose members volunteer to do unskilled manual work. With a cumulative 
public investment of as much as 274 million US dollars in the last five years (GoI, 2018a), 
                                                 
1  A Google Scholar search points to numerous district, state and national level studies on MGNREGA. These 
studies explore topics as diverse as food security, rural water management, transparency and accountability, 
migration and so on in relation to the program. 
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MGNREGA is not only India’s, but also the world’s largest public social safety net program 
(Honorati, Gentilini & Yemtsov, 2015). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh first launched the 
program in 2006 on an experimental basis in the 200 least-developed districts of India. In 2007-
08, the program was expanded to include an additional 130 districts and in 2008-09, all the 
remaining 295 districts were included under the program (GoI, 2018b).  In fiscal year, 2017-18, 
MGNREGA provided 2.29 billion person-days of employment across rural India, with 53 
percent of this employment being contributed by women (GoI, 2018c).   
The speculation that a public works program can impact real wages is not exclusive to 
MGNREGA. Almost four decades ago, the government of Maharashtra, a semi-arid state in 
western India, introduced a similar anti-poverty Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) to 
provide income to rural households in lean agricultural seasons. Ravallion et al. (1993) and 
Gaiha (1997) found evidence of a slight increase in agricultural wages as a result of the program. 
Speculations about similar impacts on real rural wages have also been extended to MGNREGA.  
The expected success of the MGNREGA program is linked to India’s dominant form of 
agriculture. In the absence of large-scale mechanization, agriculture in India remains highly 
labor-intensive. Family and hired labor are heavily employed for a range of agricultural 
activities, including weeding, transplanting, harvesting and irrigation. Presence of a large-scale 
public works program such as MGNREGA during seasons when agricultural activities are at 
their peaks and demand for labor is high (such as during harvesting) can potentially divert labor 
away from farms. This shift in labor demand can thus create a shortage of labor and lead to an 
associated increase in rural wages of unskilled workers. This potential impact of MGNREGA on 
real wages in rural India has been explored by Azam (2011), Berg et al. (2012), Narayanmoorthy 
& Bhattarai (2013) and more recently by Imbert & Papp (2015). I contribute to this growing 
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body of literature on public works programs and rural wages, using panel data obtained from the 
National Sample Survey Office’s (NSSO) Rural Price Collection (RPC) surveys from 2001 to 
2011.  
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses some of 
MGNREGA’s distinctive features, including eligibility criterion and the processes for 
participation in the program, along with its administration. Section 3 explains the underlying 
theoretical model relating the introduction of MGNREGA with change(s) in labor markets, as 
well as an overview of the recent literature examining the impact of MGNREGA on rural wages. 
In Section 4, I introduce the RPC survey data (2001-11) used for the purpose of this paper and 
explain the empirical methodology used to assess the impact of MGREGA on rural wages. 
Finally, I present findings in Section 5 before concluding (Section 6).  
2. MGNREGA: Program Details  
Most social safety net programs in India and elsewhere around the world are targeted programs, 
wherein the Government is responsible for identifying the beneficiaries.2 MGNREGA is 
designed on a different approach, where administrative gaps in targeting are overcome by 
individuals’ self-selection into the program. In other words, instead of the government 
identifying the beneficiaries to be employed in the public works offered under the program; 
individuals in rural India who need to support their income can choose to be employed under the 
program.3 MGNREGA thus works as a highly demand-driven social-safety net program.  
                                                 
2 Poverty lines are one of the most common base on which the Indian Government identifies program participants 
for various social-safety net programs.  
3 For a discussion on the benefits of this “self-selection” (or self-targeting) approach over targeted programs, see 
Shankar & Gaiha (2013), p. 19-23. 
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Another powerful and distinct feature of MGNREGA is that it takes a legal and a rights-based 
approach. If an applicant is not assigned a job within 15 days of application, the applicant is 
entitled to a daily unemployment allowance as guaranteed under the Act. The applicant is not 
only guaranteed employment but is also guaranteed minimum wages according to the Minimum 
Wages Act of 1948 for agricultural laborers in the State. Men and women are entitled to the same 
minimum wage rates. Further, all employment is supposed to be provided within a radius of five 
kilometers of the applicant’s residence; if not, the applicant is entitled to extra remuneration to 
cover the transportation costs.  
MGNREGA’s primary aim is to enhance the economic security of rural households. A secondary 
aim is to create durable and productive assets in rural areas by funding activities related to the 
creation of sustainable resources in the program villages. The choice of public works offered 
under MGNREGA, hence, spans projects including road construction, creation of irrigation 
canals, afforestation, renovation of lakes and desalination of tanks, flood control, and agriculture 
and livestock related activities.  
The Central government pays 90 percent of the program costs, including payment of wages, 
three-fourths of the material costs, and a certain proportion of the administrative costs, while the 
state government is responsible for the remaining costs. Local administrative bodies, the Gram 
Panchayats (Village Councils) play a central role in the implementation of the program. Job 
applications are submitted to the Gram Panchayat, and the Panchayat is required to issue a Job-
card to the applicants within 15 days of the receipt of application. Applicants must request at 
least 14 days of employment. It is important to note that multiple adult members of a single 
household can simultaneously participate in the program. Wages are to be disbursed weekly, 
increasingly through a savings account at a local bank or the post-office. 
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3. MGNREGA and Labor markets 
Overview of Recent Literature: MGNREGA’s primary objective is to maintain rural 
households’ income above the poverty line, and its secondary objective is to generate sustainable 
and productive assets in the rural areas of India. Yet, in the last six years, at least five empirical 
studies have emerged exploring unintended “tertiary” benefit of MGNREGA—the anticipated 
increase in overall rural wages as a result of the program. Each of these studies exploit the 
phased implementation of MGNREGA for utilizing non-experimental evaluation methods to 
determine the program’s impact on rural wages. For instance, Azam (2012) employed a 
differences-in-differences framework using the Employment and Unemployment schedules 
carried out by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO). He found that MGNREGA has a 
significant positive impact of almost eight percent on the wages of female casual (or short term 
manual labor) workers, but only a marginal impact on that of male workers. Imbert and Papp 
(2015) also employed the Employment and Unemployment schedules by the NSSO (for a 
different time period) and a differences-in-differences framework and found evidence of 
increases in private sector wages.  
Zimmerman (2012) on the other hand used a regression discontinuity design (RDD) for her 
analysis using data from NSSO’s 64th round (2007-08). The fact that Phase 1 and 2 of 
MGNREGA had already been implemented by 2007-08 and Phase 3 was yet to be implemented 
generated a cut-off, allowing for the application of the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) 
framework. The paper also utilizes the fact that poor districts were the first to receive 
MGNREGA and that there is a discontinuity in the probability of being enrolled in MGNREGA 
at the cut-off in Phase 2. Her findings are similar to that of Azam’s: she finds evidence of 
significant increase in rural wages of females but not males. Narayanmoorthi and Bhattarai 
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(2013) use wage data from 2001-11 from the Labor Bureau, Government of India, to assess wage 
rates by gender and labor tasks before and after the introduction of MGNREGA. While their 
results are not strictly causal, their regression results suggest a substantial increase in real wage 
rates post-MGNREGA for both males and females, with a higher increase rate for female 
workers.  
Finally, Berg et al. (2012) use data from Agricultural Wages in India (2001-11) published by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and also employ a differences-in-differences framework; they find that 
MGNREGA on average increases wages by 5.5 percent. Contrary to Azam (2012), Zimmerman 
(2012) and Narayanmoorthi and Bhattarai (2013), however, they do not find any evidence of the 
program in reducing wage gaps between males and females.  
The seasonal demand for agricultural labor in rural India and the year-round functioning of 
MGNREGA merits some discussion here. MGNREGA’s intended benefits are primarily for the 
lean agricultural seasons, when agricultural activities are relatively slack. For instance, in the 
months of March and April, temperatures in most regions are high, there is no or limited rainfall, 
and few farmers cultivate summer crops. It is during these months of slack in agricultural 
activities that farm laborers lose their potential sources of income and are at a risk of “going 
hungry” or in debt. MGNREGA, by providing these laborers guaranteed employment, is 
expected to help them maintain their wages and smooth their consumption. Thus, for the lean 
seasons, when agricultural activities are relatively low and demand for private labor is also low, 
one would not expect to see a substantial increase in private rural wages.  
In practice, however, MGNREGA is operational throughout the year, not just during the lean 
seasons. Figure 1 shows that in the last fiscal year (2017-18), more than 1 billion person-days of 
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employment was generated under the program in the peak agricultural months of July, August 
and September. By diverting labor away from the fields, MGNREGA can potentially create labor 
shortages in the peak agricultural months and lead to a substantial increase in rural wages.  
Theoretical Model:  The implicit theoretical model employed by most relevant papers is that of 
demand and supply in labor markets. Bhargava (2014), in his paper on MGNREGA and the use 
of resource saving technology in agriculture, highlights different theoretical models that can be 
applied to understand the impacts of the program on labor markets. 
One of the most intuitive models included in Bhargava’s (2014) paper is from Narayan, Parikh & 
Srinivasan’s (1988) theoretical study of Maharashtra’s EGS program, which distinguishes 
between labor demand in peak and lean agricultural seasons (Figure 3). L is the total labor 
available for work in a lean agricultural season. The demand for labor represented by DL is low 
and only LL number of laborers are in fact hired. This leaves a labor surplus or unemployment of 
L- LL in a lean season. With the introduction of public works program such as MGNREGA, there 
is an outward shift in the demand for labor, reflected by DL' and new total lean season labor is 
now at LT. As Bhargava (2014) notes that this shift to LT will be determined by how much 
demand is generated as a result of the public works program. If the LT remains less than L or in 
other words the public works program does not exhaust the available labor, there will be no 
effect on labor employment for agriculture (which remains at LL in the lean season). Laborers 
now, however, benefit from increased program wages (WN).  
This simple theoretical framework of demand and supply, is complicated by two scenarios 
inherent to Indian agriculture. First, extreme climatic conditions hound Indian agricultural 
frequently. Anticipation of, say, a drought condition may cause farmers to not invest in crop 
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cultivation at a usual scale, which in turn can lower the demand for farm-labor. In such an event 
one would not expect to see a noticeable increase in rural wages, even in the peak agricultural-
activity months.  
A further consideration is to take into account migration rates in lean seasons or drought years, 
when laborers often migrate to cities in search for employment (distress-migration). If such 
migration is a prominent feature in a region and the availability of MGNREGA is unable to 
contain it, we again might not observe an increase in wages due to the program’s limited impact 
on labor supply. Any results on impact on wages due to shifts in the supply curve would have to 
be understood in light of these two very plausible scenarios.  
Before we delve into our own analysis of MGNREGA’s impact on rural wages, it is also 
important to conceptually understand whether the anticipated wage impacts of a public works 
program are desirable in rural India. There emerge two critical dimensions to the program’s 
impact on rural wages. 
First is the potential impact of wage increases on the profitability and viability of agriculture. 
Though these characteristics vary widely from state to state, an average farmer has about 1.5 
hectares of land, a monthly income of 6,426 INR (99 USD) and would spend about 493 INR or 
22.5 percent of the total input costs on labor (S. Rukmani, 2017). The extent to which an increase 
in rural wages due to MGNREGA could impact farmers’ profitability would greatly depend on 
the economic conditions (land holding size, income from other sources etc.) of the farmers who 
are using hired labor for their farm operations. The majority of the farmers in the country are 
small and marginal, owning less than a hectare of land. An increase in rural wages is likely to 
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impact this group of farmers the most, posing a risk to not only their profitability but also the 
very viability of agriculture.  
The second dimension pertains to wage equity in rural India. While there is wide variation 
among states, Rani & Belser (2012) find that minimum wages are weakly enforced across 
several states in India. For instance, more than 40-50 percent of agricultural workers in major 
agrarian states such as Maharashtra and Karnataka were paid below the state-defined minimum 
wages in 2009-10 (ibid). A public works program such as MGNREGA, by diverting labor away 
from farms, can potentially increase wages and bring them up to the legal minimum.  
Moreover, despite the minimum wages, women in rural India have historically been paid lower 
than men for the same labor activities (Mahajan, 2011). Women form about 55-66 percent of the 
total labor force engaged in agriculture (Bhattacharya & Goyal, 2017). Yet, their wages are about 
30 percent lower on average than their male counterparts for various agricultural operations 
(ibid). MGNREGA, however, entitles males and females to the same wages. Thus, effectively, a 
rise in rural wages due to MGNREGA, should also lead to convergence between male and 
female wages for agricultural labor.  
In a country as diverse as India, the exact trade-offs between equity in rural India and 
profitability as well as the viability of agriculture would greatly depend upon the specific socio-
economic context of a region. By providing broad estimates of the extent of the anticipated 
impact on rural wages, if any, due to the introduction of MGNREGA, this paper helps develop 
an understanding towards both these dimensions. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
RPC Survey: The data on rural wages used here are drawn from the Rural Price Collection 
(RPC) surveys conducted between 2001 and 2011 by the NSSO. Since 1950-51, the NSSO has 
been collecting rural price data with the aim of determining the consumer price index (CPI) for 
agricultural and rural populations. In 1986, following the recommendations of NSSO’s Technical 
Working Group on Retail Prices, the RPC surveys added a schedule on wage rate data for major 
agricultural and non-agricultural occupations. Data were to be used for (i) enforcement of 
Government stipulated minimum wages; (ii) implementation of the wage policy; and (iii) for the 
estimation of the state gross domestic product and income. Along with the price data of 260 
commodities in the rural commodity basket, the survey now also includes data on rural wage 
rates (INR/day) for agricultural and rural occupations.  
The NSS has identified 66 regions across the 24 Indian states for the RPC surveys. These regions 
are further divided into a total of 187 strata from which 603 sample villages have been drawn. 
These sample villages remain unchanged for the yearly RPC surveys, and wage rate data from 
them are collected on a monthly basis for 11 agricultural and seven non-agricultural occupations. 
In instances where wage rates are reported for fewer or more than the normal working hours of 
eight hours per day, the data are adjusted and then reported. Village level authorities, including 
the Panchayat (village council) secretary, Progress Assistant, patwari (local level land record 
official) along with some Block level officials, serve as the chief informants for average daily 
wage rates.  
Data: I use the monthly RPC data merged with the district level phase identifiers for 
MGNREGA. If MGNREGA was introduced in a district in 2006 (treatment), the corresponding 
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phase identifier takes a value of 1. In 2007 and 2009, the MGNREGA identifier takes a value of 
2 and 3 respectively.  
The final dataset consists of panel data of village level average monthly real wage rates for a 
range of rural occupations for all years from 2001 to 2011 (except 2008)4  for 597 villages and 
378 districts across 24 Indian states, for a total of 439,805 observations. Monthly wage data for 
2001 are available for October, November and December. For 2009 the data are available from 
July to December and for 2011 the data are available from January to June. For all the remaining 
years, wage data exists for all the twelve months, except 2008.  
One of the key features of the program that allows me to test for the impact on rural wages is the 
phase-wise implementation of the program. 140 of the 378 districts in the dataset fall in Phase 1 
of MGNREGA, 83 in Phase 2 and 155 in the third Phase of the program (Table 1). As will be 
explained below, availability of such data allows me to estimate the impact of the program on 
rural wages by using differences-in-differences estimation.  
To effectively assess the impact of MGNREGA on rural wages, I draw a distinction between 
agricultural and non-agricultural labor, since labor demand for these two groups is likely to be 
different across the year. Following NSSO’s classification of occupations, I classify the 21 
occupations in the RPC schedule as agricultural and non-agricultural. Tables 2 and 3 provide the 
overall distribution of the various labor occupations in agricultural and non-agricultural activities 
in the data. This distribution does not change substantially from one year to the other. The 
average daily wage rates for various rural occupations for males and females for 2001 are 
reported in Table 4. As expected, average male wages were higher by about 27 Indian Rupees 
                                                 
4 I was unable to obtain the RPC data for 2008, presumably because the survey was not carried out that year.  
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(INR) per day. The gender wage gap is much higher for non-agricultural wages (38 INR per day) 
compared to the gap in agricultural wages (14 INR per day). 
The wage data in cash as well as imputed wages for kind (meals, food grains, tea, fuel, cigarettes, 
fodder and so on) are provided for males, females, as well as children. Since child labor forms a 
small fraction of our data, I restrict the analysis to adult males and females, aged 18 or more. I 
work with two sets of wages for both males and females in this paper for the main analysis 
(difference-in-difference): (i) a total wage that includes both cash and imputed wages for kind; 
and (ii) wages solely in cash. Doing so allows me to address two concerns. First, the 
monetization of in-kind payments is likely to be affected by some calculation errors during the 
data collection process. Second, it is plausible that any change in wages due to a public works 
program is more likely to be reflected in wages in cash and not in-kind (especially if the wages 
in-kind include meals). The wages in the RPC schedule are in nominal terms. I convert them into 
2000 real wages by using January 2000 CPI data for India for agricultural and rural workers. All 
the descriptive statistics are reported in terms of total wages (cash and kind) in 2000 constant 
prices.  
 I restrict the analysis to hired labor. Around four percent of the observations for male cash 
wages and 66 percent of female cash wages are reported as zero, suggesting two probable cases. 
First, the corresponding labor was either mostly generated from within the family and was thus 
not paid. Second, the wage data were not reported (i.e. the data are missing). The impact of a 
public works program would be reflected in changes associated with only the hired labor. These 
null values of wages are, therefore, extraneous to our analysis and I exclude them from our 
dataset. Finally, for the difference-in-difference estimation I generate variables for the following: 
(i) monthly averages of wage rates for agricultural occupations, for males and females separately 
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and (ii) monthly averages of wage rates for non-agricultural occupations, for males and females 
separately. 
Methodology: Differences-in-differences is a widely employed non-experimental technique that 
allows us to determine the impact of a program with a treatment and control group and with pre- 
and post-treatment values of the outcome variable. I exploit the phased implementation of 
MGNREGA between 2006 and 2009 to conduct a multi-period difference-in-difference analysis. 
The treatment refers to the introduction of MGNREGA in a district.   
Equation 1 represents the underlying model used for this difference-in-difference estimation. 
𝑊𝑖𝑡 is the outcome variable calculated as the log of daily wage rate in district i and month t. The 
district fixed effects (controlling for the time invariant characteristics of the districts) are 
captured by 𝛼𝑖, while 𝑀𝑡 controls for any time trends that would affect the districts in the same 
way, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The presence of the program in district i and month t is given by 
the dummy 𝐷1𝑖𝑡, which takes a value of 0 before the introduction of the program in a district and 
a value of 1 after its introduction. The interaction term between the treatment (𝐷1𝑖𝑡) and time 
variable (𝑀𝑡), given by 𝐷2𝑖𝑡, allows for a change in the time trend in the effect of MGNREGA 
on wages following its introduction in district i. Before MGNREGA is introduced in a district, 
𝐷2𝑖𝑡 takes a value of 0 and following the introduction of the program, it increases by one every 
month  
        𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽M𝑡+ ó𝐷1𝑖𝑡 + θ𝐷2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (1) 
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The coefficient ó, gives the initial ‘jump’ or discontinuity in rural wages at the very beginning of 
the program introduction in a district i (Figure 8).  The coefficient corresponding to 𝐷2𝑖𝑡, θ, is 
the difference-in-difference estimator, which indicates whether or not the program has had a 
significant impact on rural wages since its introduction. This model assumes that the effect of the 
program can be different in the three implementation phase districts.  
 
 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
Ploughing (17.81 percent), weeding (14.23 percent), harvesting (13.73 percent), tractor driving 
(13.12 percent), transplanting (9.64 percent) formed the highest proportion of agricultural 
occupations in the sample (Table 2). Among non-agricultural occupations unskilled labor (21.26 
percent), carpenter (20.38 percent), mason (20.24 percent), and blacksmith (14.37 percent) were 
the most common occupations (Table 3).  
The data clearly reflect the gender wage gap prevailing in all rural occupations in India. In 2001 
a male laborer (agricultural or non-agricultural) was likely to receive 1.6 times the female wage 
rate on average for the same occupation (Table 4). For agricultural labor specifically, females 
received around 43 INR per day on average whereas males received as much as 57 INR per day. 
The wage gap was much higher for non-agricultural wages, where the average wages for male 
labor were about 80 INR per day and only 41 INR per day for females. 
 
Figures 4-7 depict the trends in average monthly wages for male and female agricultural and 
non-agricultural wage rates from 2001 to 2011 in the three implementation phase districts. The 
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vertical lines indicate the time of introduction of MGNREGA in the districts. Two key points 
emerge from these.  
First, average wage rates in Phase 1 districts are the lowest across the three phases. This is not 
surprising, considering that the Government had made a deliberate effort to include the poorest 
districts in the first phase of the program. Wage rates in Phase 3 districts are much higher, 
reflecting the fact that they were indeed economically better-off districts as compared to the 
others. Second, the trend lines indicate that the wage rates have been following an approximate 
parallel trend in the three implementation phase districts. This allows the data to meet the key 
identifying assumption of parallel trends, which is crucial to get unbiased difference-in-
difference estimates. By just looking at these figures, it is difficult to discern whether there is a 
significant ‘jump’ or effect in wages, post the introduction of MGNREGA. Female agricultural 
wages (Figure 6) and non-agricultural wages (Figure 7), however, do suggest some convergence 
in wage rates between Phase 2 and Phase 3 districts.  
The results from the difference-in-difference estimation are presented in Tables 5 (dependent 
variable is daily wage rate in cash and kind) and Table 6 (dependent variable is daily wage rate 
in cash only). The variables treatp1, treatp2 and treatp3, indicate the initial effect of the program 
on wages for Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 districts, respectively. Positive and significant 
coefficients found for treatp2 and treatp3 (given by ó in Equation 1) suggest that MGNREGA 
had initially raised rural wages in Phase 2 and 3 districts. The negative coefficients on treatp1 for 
most wage categories, however, are counterintuitive as they suggest that the program in fact 
initially lowered wages in the Phase 1 districts. As mentioned earlier, districts included in the 
first phase of MGNREGA were the most marginalized districts of the country. A possible 
explanation could be that in the initial stages of the program, its administration and impact were 
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both heavily constrained by the relatively lower administrative capabilities of these districts, but 
the (negative) direction of the coefficient still remains surprising.  
The key variables of interest are the interaction variables for the three phases (trend1, trend2 and 
trend3). In both Tables 5 and 6, the coefficients on the trend variables (given by θ in Equation 1) 
suggest that the effect of the program were positive and highly significant for male and female 
agricultural as well as non-agricultural wages. Looking at the highly significant and positive 
coefficients for trendp1 across all four labor categories, it appears that after nine months of the 
introduction of the program, the wage trend associated with the program overcame the initial 
drop in wages in Phase 1 districts (given by the coefficient on treatp1). In other words, the effect 
of MGNREGA on rural wages over time, in even the most marginalized districts of the country, 
was significant and positive—varying between 1.92 and 4.91 per cent for male agricultural and 
female non-agricultural wages, respectively. 
Across all labor categories and phases, the effect of the program appears to be the lowest for 
male agricultural and non-agricultural wages in Phase 1 districts. Effects are higher for other 
labor groups and phases. For example, in Table 5 the coefficient for trendp1 in Column 3 
suggests that MGNREGA increased female agricultural wage rates on average by about 0.41 
percent per month or about 4.92 percent annually, in Phase 1 districts. The corresponding impact 
of the program on female agricultural wage rates in Phase 2 districts was around 0.62 percent per 
month or a 7.44 percent annual increase. Overall, it appears that Phase 2 and Phase 3 districts 
observed a higher increase in male and female wage rates compared to Phase 1 districts. (Table 
5). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper uses data from the Rural Price Collection (RPC) surveys conducted between 2001 
and 2011 by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO), Government of India to assess whether 
the world’s largest public workfare program—the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)—led to an impact on male and female agricultural and non-
agricultural wage rates in rural India. The paper contributes to a growing body of literature trying 
to understand the impact of public welfare programs, such as MGNREGA in India.  
 
The paper uses the non-experimental evaluation technique of difference-in-difference to assess 
the impact of MGNREGA on male and female wages rates in each of the three program 
implementation phase districts. Two broad findings emerge from the study. First, the impact of 
the program appears to be higher in magnitude in Phase 2 and Phase 3 districts, as compared to 
Phase 1 districts. For instance, Phase 1 districts suggest an average monthly increase of 0.23 
percent (or 2.76 percent annual increase) in male agricultural wage rates. The corresponding 
annual increase in wage rates in Phase 2 and 3 districts is about 7.44 percent and 9.69, 
respectively. Similarly, Phase 1 districts suggest an average annual increase of only about 4.8 
percent in the wage rates of female agricultural workers, compared to 7.28 percent in Phase 2 
and 7.22 percent in Phase 3 districts. 
The districts where MGNREGA was first introduced in 2006 (Phase 1) were in fact the most 
marginalized districts in the country with relatively weak administrative systems. It is likely that 
the effect of the program on rural wages was limited by its weak implementation in Phase 1 
districts. Even though one would expect fewer people to gain from an anti-poverty program in 
better-off districts, the relatively developed Phase 3 districts might have in fact witnessed a 
higher program enrollment due to stronger and more efficient local administrative mechanisms 
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pertaining to information sharing and allocation of MGNREGA jobs as well as disbursal of 
payment.  
This study thus sheds light on the importance of administrative capabilities in program 
implementation. The poorer districts in Phase 1, include states in central and eastern India, 
including parts of Bihar—the poorest state in India. My own field experience from Bihar and 
other parts of India suggests that the most well-intentioned public schemes can often be 
constrained by administrative factors. For instance, a study I conducted with my co-authors on a 
conditional cash subsidy scheme for irrigation in drought years in Bihar, highlighted the fact that 
the delays and uncertainties around the disbursal of the subsidy money, severely constrained the 
effectiveness of the scheme (Kishore, Joshi & Pandey, 2015). MGNREGA, while also a well-
designed scheme, may be limited in its impact due to weak local administrative systems. A 
further step in checking the robustness of this analysis would be to bring in district level rainfall 
controls and a control for the intensity of program implementation and participation.  
Second, the results suggest a slightly higher effect on female wages as compared to male wages, 
but this too varies across the three phases. This difference is particularly noticeable in Phase 1 
districts, where the impact of MGNREGA on female agricultural and non-agricultural wages is 
around 4.9 percent, while that on male wages is only about 1.9 to 2.4 percent. In Phase 2 
districts, effects on male and female agricultural wages are almost similar. Female non-
agricultural wages, however, show a higher increase of around 8.5 percent compared to 6.6 
percent for male non-agricultural wages in Phase 2 districts. Finally, Phase 3 districts show a 
comparatively higher increase in male wage rates as compared to female wage rates, for both 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities.  
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High enrollment of women in MGNREGA coupled with the fact that women were traditionally 
being paid lower than men across all labor categories, provides a rationale for why we see a 
greater impact on female wages compared to male’s in Phase 1 and Phase 2 districts. It is 
extremely likely that wage gaps were even higher to begin with in the more marginalized 
districts included in Phase 1 and Phase 2 of MGNREGA. The findings suggest that MGNREGA 
may have been effective in converging male and female rates and thus reduce the gender wage 
gap in these marginalized regions. This is encouraging, considering that women across the 
country have reported lower wages across all labor categories. The findings that a national 
employment guarantee program has in fact played a role in converging these wages, even if 
unintentionally, also hold relevance for policy-makers in other parts of the developing world that 
are exploring social-safety net programs and facing similar issues in gender-wage equality. 
A further step in this analysis would be to assess whether these wage impacts vary between lean 
and peak agricultural seasons. An analysis of this nature would further help to capture and 
understand the more transient changes in rural labor markets that a large public works program 
such as MGNREGA can potentially induce.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of India highlighting the three implementation phases of 
MGNREGA 
 
 
 
Source: Berg et al. (2017) 
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Figure 2: Month-wise number of person-days employment carried out under MGNREGA 
in India (2017-18) 
 
 
 
Data source: GoI (2018d) 
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Figure 3: Labor supply in peak and lean seasons in rural India 
 
   Source: Bhargava (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Trends in Male agricultural wages (INR/day) in the three implementation phase districts of MGNREGA  
                          (wages are in INR 2000 constant prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Black line indicates the year MGNREGA was introduced in these districts. 
           Wage rate data for 2008 is missing. 
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Figure 5: Trends in Male non-agricultural wages (INR/day) in the three implementation phase districts of MGNREGA  
                        (wages are in INR 2000 constant prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Black line indicates the year MGNREGA was introduced in these districts. 
           Wage rate data for 2008 is missing. 
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Figure 6: Trends in Female agricultural wages (INR/day) in the three implementation phase districts of MGNREGA  
                          (wages are in INR 2000 constant prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Black line indicates the year MGNREGA was introduced in these districts. 
           Wage rate data for 2008 is missing. 
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Figure 7: Trends in Female non-agricultural wages (INR/day) in the three implementation phase districts of MGNREGA 
                      (wages are in INR 2000 constant prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Black line indicates the year MGNREGA was introduced in these districts. 
           Wage rate data for 2008 is missing.
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Figure 8: Graphical representation of the effect of MGNREGA on rural wages  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Wit is the log of daily wages and Mt indicates the time trend that affects all districts similarly. The initial slope 
of the equation is represented by 𝛽. After the introduction of the program, the slope shifts to 𝛽 + θ, capturing the 
effect of the program on rural wages over time. The ‘jump’ or discontinuity in wages is represented by ó.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 - Districts in different phases of MGNREGA 
 
(a) MGNREGA Phase 1 (2006-07) districts in sample  
 
Kupwara Bhojpur Malkangiri Nizamabad 
Chamba Bhabua Koriya Karimnagar 
Hoshiarpur Rohtas Surguja Medak 
Tehri Garhwal Jehanabad Jashpur Ranga Reddy 
Sirsa Gaya Raigarh Mahboob Nagar 
Mahendragarh Nawada Bilaspur Nalgonda 
Jaipur Tamenglong Rajnandgaon Warangal 
Dungarpur Dhalai Dhamtari Khammam 
Banswara West Garo Hills Kanker Vizianagaram 
Jhalawar Kokrajhar Bastar Cuddapah 
Kheri Goalpara Dantewada Anantpur 
Sitapur Lakhimpur Tikamgarh Chittoor 
Hardoi Karbiaglong Chhatarpur Gulbarga 
Unnao North Cachar Hills Satna Bidar 
Rai Bareli Jalpaiguri Umaria Raichur 
Jalaun South Dinajpur Shahdol Davanagere 
Lalitpur Maldha Sidhi Palakkad 
Banda Murshidabad Jhabua Villupuram 
Fatepur Birdhum Dhar Dindigul 
Pratapgarh Bankura Indore Cuddalore 
Gorakhpur Puruliya East Nimar Nagapattinam 
Kushi Nagar Midnapur Jabalpur Sivgangai 
Azamgarh Palamau Mandla Adilabad 
Jaunpur Chatra Seoni Nalanda 
Chaundli Giridihi Balaghat Patna 
Mirzapur Godda Bans Kantha Sonepur 
Sheohar Dhanbad Kadana Bolangir 
Madhubani Ranchi Palsana Aurangabad 
Supaul Gumla Dangs Ahmadnagar 
Kishanganj Jharsuguda Dhule Munger 
Purnea Deogarh Amaravati Gajapati 
Katihar Sundargarh Bhandara Nanded 
Darbhanga Keonjhar Gondiya  
Muzaffarpur Mayurbhanj Gadchiroli  
Vaishali Dhenkanal Chandrapur  
Samastipur Ganjam Yavatmal  
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(b) MGNREGA Phase 2 (2007-08) districts in sample  
 
Anantnag Cachar 
Jammu Darjeeling 
Kangra Kochbihar 
Mandi Burdwan 
Amritsar Nadia 
Jalandhar Hooghly 
Ambala Deoghar 
Sawai Madhopur Paschim Singhbhum 
Jaisalmer Baleshwar 
Jalor Jajpur 
Chittaurgarh Angul 
Etah Korba 
Budaun Raipur 
Kanpur Nagar Mahasamund 
Ambedkar Nagar Datia 
Sultanpur Guna 
Bahraich Panna 
Balrampur Damoh 
Gonda Rewa 
Basti Dewas 
Maharajganj Rajgarh 
Ballia Chhindwara 
West Champaran Ahmedabad 
East Champaran Buldana 
Saharsa Akola 
Gopalganj Washim 
Siwan Wardha 
Saran Thane 
Begusarai Osmanabad 
Bhagalpur Srikakulam 
Chandel East Godavari 
West Tripura Guntur 
South Tripura Prakasam 
East Khasi Hills Nellore 
Jaintia Hills Kurnool 
Barpeta Bellary 
Nalbari Shimoga 
Darrang Chikmagalur 
Morigaon Hassan 
Thanjavur 
Tirunelveli 
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(c) MGNREGA Phase 3 (2008-09) districts in sample  
 
 
Barmula Bulandshahr Sehore Bangalore Rural 
Badgam Aligarh Raisen Mandya 
Pulwama Hathras Hoshangabad Dakshin Kannad 
Udhampur Mathura Narsimhapur Mysore 
Rajouri Mainpuri Kachchh Chamarajnagar 
Kathus Bareilly Harij Kannur 
Una Pilibhit Kheralu Kozhikode 
Solan Shahjahanpur Talod Malapuram 
Shimla Kannauj Kalol Trichur 
Kapurthala Auraiya Surendranagar Ernakulam 
Rupnagar (Ropar) Allahabad Rajkot Kottayam 
Ludhiana Deoria Jamnagar Alappuzm 
Firozpur Ghazipur Junagadh Pathanamthitta 
Muktsar S.Ravidas Nagar Amreli Kollam 
Bhatinda Senapati Bhavnagar Triruvananthapuram 
Sangrur Thoubal Anand Tiruvallur 
Patiala Imphal West Kheda Kahchipuram 
Pauri Garhwal Imphal East Sinor Vellore 
Almora Notrh Tripura Dharampur Dharampuri 
Yamuna Nagar East Garo Hills Jalgaon Salem 
Kurukshetra West Khasi Hills Nagpur Namakkal 
Panipat Nangpoh Parbhani Erode 
Sonipat Kamrup Jalna Perambalur 
Jind Tinsukia Nashik Pudukottai 
Hisar Dibrugarh Raigarh(Kulaba) Madurai 
Rewari Sibsagar Pune Virudhu Nagar 
Gurgaon Karimganj Latur Toothukudi 
North West Howrah Solapur Kannyakumari 
Ganganagar Kendrapara Satara Dharampuri 
Churu Jagatsinghpura Ratnagiri Shajapur 
Alwar Nayagarh Sindhudurg West Nimar 
Bharatpur Puri Kolhapur Vidisha 
Nagaur Phulbani Sangli Tumkur 
Ajmer Durg Vishakhapatnam Kolar 
Kota Morena West Godawari Bangalore Urban 
Saharanpur Gwalior Krishna  
Muzaffarnagar Sagar Bijapur  
Bijnor Mandsaur Gadag  
Moradabad Ratlam Uttar Kannad  
G. Buddha Nagar Ujjain Haveri  
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Table 2 – Distribution of agricultural labor occupations in the Retail Price Collection 
(RPC) survey dataset (2001-11) 
 
 
Labor   Observations        % 
Ploughing 37,647 17.81 
Sowing 31,494 14.90 
Weeding 30,074 14.23 
Transplanting 20,370 9.64 
Harvesting 29,018 13.73 
Winnowing 12,385 5.86 
Threshing 13,871 6.56 
Cane crushing 3,658 1.73 
Tractor driver 27,744 13.12 
cotton picking 1,678 0.79 
Jute picking 33 0.02 
Tea picking 10 0 
Other picking 3,403 1.61    
n 211,385 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Distribution of non-agricultural labor occupations in the Retail Price Collection 
(RPC) survey dataset (2001-11) 
 
 
Occupation Observations % 
Herd man 16,935 7.41 
Well digging 11,504 5.04 
Carpenter 46,560 20.38 
Blacksmith 32,826 14.37 
Cobbler 20,071 8.79 
Mason 46,242 20.24 
Sweeper 5,727 2.51 
Unskilled labor 48,555 21.26    
n 228,420 
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Table 4 – Average male and female wage rates (INR/day) for different agricultural and 
non-agricultural occupations in the Retail Price Collection (RPC) survey dataset in 2001 
(2000 constant prices) 
 
 
Occupation Male (INR/day) Female (INR/day) 
 Agricultural Labor 
Ploughing  63.17 44.71 
Sowing 55.91 42.52 
Weeding 48.45 41.58 
Transplanting 51.01 45.45 
Harvesting 51.92 43.54 
Winnowing 48.83 43.29 
Threshing 49.28 44.35 
Cotton picking                      45.99 34.35 
Jute picking 48.51 - 
Others picking 61.73 43.03 
Tractor driver 78.01 - 
     Mean agricultural wages          57.41 43.04 
 Non-Agricultural Labor  
Carpenter 100.71 40.80 
Blacksmith 77.77 - 
Cobbler 57.12 - 
Mason 110.46 41.26 
Herd man 39.05 31.93 
Well digging 79.21 44.48 
Sweeper 42.53 39.26 
Unskilled labor 54.55 42.10 
    Mean non- agricultural wages 79.78 41.43 
Mean (all labor) 69.51 42.56 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Difference-in-difference results for Male and Female agricultural and non-
agricultural wages (cash and kind) for the three implementation phase districts of 
MGNREGA (wages are in INR 2000 constant prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Male agricultural 
wages 
Male non-agricultural 
wages 
Female agricultural 
wages 
Female non-
agricultural wages 
          
Time (in months) -0.000148 -0.000490*** -.0000128 -0.000110 
 (0.000180) (0.000136) (0.000178) (0.000218) 
treatp1 -0.0130 -0.0183** -0.0406*** -0.0463*** 
 (0.0133) (0.00878) (0.0149) (0.0152) 
treatp2 0.0389** -0.0115 0.0591** 0.0435* 
 (0.0195) (0.0145) (0.0243) (0.0241) 
treatp3 0.0265 0.00400 0.0826*** 0.0620** 
 (0.0196) (0.0149) (0.0231) (0.0255) 
trendp1 0.00230*** 0.00161*** 0.00400*** 0.00409*** 
 (0.000463) (0.000399) (0.000528) (0.000520) 
trendp2 0.00620*** 0.00544*** 0.00607*** 0.00708*** 
 (0.000716) (0.000638) (0.000952) (0.00101) 
trendp3 0.00808*** 0.00679*** 0.00602*** 0.00527*** 
 (0.000530) (0.000470) (0.000752) (0.000783) 
Constant 4.089*** 4.393*** 3.734*** 3.674*** 
 (0.00720) (0.00554) (0.00741) (0.00873) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 30,439 31,631 24,779 24,245 
R-squared 0.046 0.024 0.104 0.091 
Number of districts 377 378 368 351 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 6 – Difference-in-difference results for Male and Female agricultural and non-
agricultural wages (cash only) for the three implementation phase districts of MGNREGA 
(wages are in INR 2000 constant prices) 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Male agricultural 
wages 
Male non-agricultural 
wages 
Female agricultural 
wages 
Female non-
agricultural wages 
          
Time (in months) -0.000250 -0.000491*** .0000883 -.0000259e 
 (0.000194) (0.000140) (0.000191) (0.000226) 
treatp1 -0.0306** -0.0269*** -0.0350** -0.0428** 
 (0.0137) (0.00847) (0.0147) (0.0167) 
treatp2 0.0635*** -0.000932 0.0639*** 0.0533** 
 (0.0195) (0.0145) (0.0242) (0.0239) 
treatp3 0.0691*** 0.0258* 0.0878*** 0.0752*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0149) (0.0243) (0.0270) 
trendp1 0.00298*** 0.00178*** 0.00410*** 0.00406*** 
 (0.000481) (0.000397) (0.000555) (0.000542) 
trendp2 0.00591*** 0.00520*** 0.00609*** 0.00664*** 
 (0.000766) (0.000654) (0.00107) (0.00105) 
trendp3 0.00605*** 0.00544*** 0.00578*** 0.00523*** 
 (0.000530) (0.000481) (0.000760) (0.000787) 
Constant 4.018*** 4.354*** 3.641*** 3.590*** 
 (0.00774) (0.00568) (0.00792) (0.00885) 
     
Observations 30,396 31,624 24,023 24,245 
R-squared 0.058 0.025 0.124 0.105 
Number of districts 377 378 367 351 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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